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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 03-3614
            
 
DOUGLAS PHILIP MCDANIELS, (In the Matter of Shad-Myra Marie McDaniels, an
infant); JACQUELINE GONZALEZ, (grandmother)
Appellants
v.
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES; KIM
KRUYSMAN, (agency representation); ANGELA LA MANNA, (child placement
review coordinator); GERRY HENDERSON; DENISE HENDERSON, (his wife);
CHRISTOPHER HOWELL, (investigator); SHALANDA MARTIN, (case worker);
KATHLEEN HOEFLER, (supervisor family service specialist II); STEPHANIE
ANATALE; NEW JERSEY, DYFS for the agency
Appellees
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Civ. No. 02-5010 (GEB))
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
         
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
 Date: March 10, 2005
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ROTH and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed:    March 31, 2005)
         
2OPINION OF THE COURT
         
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Douglas Philip McDaniels and Jacqueline Gonzalez appeal the district court’s
grant of a motion for summary judgment which dismissed their claims brought under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 (2000). We review whether the district court properly abstained
from deciding this case on the basis of the Younger Abstention Doctrine, set forth in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the district court correctly applied the Younger Abstention
Doctrine, we will affirm. 
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts,    
procedural history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary
to the discussion. 
II.
The abstention defined in Younger, a criminal case, was made applicable to civil
cases in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S.
423 (1982). In Middlesex, the Court distilled the three requirements for the application of
the Younger Abstention Doctrine: (1) the existence of an ongoing state proceeding which
is judicial in nature; (2) an ongoing state proceeding which implicates important state
interests; and (3) an ongoing state proceeding which presents an adequate opportunity to
3raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. Id. at 431-432. The Court has also
made clear that the state proceeding need not be ongoing at the time the federal complaint
is before the court as long as the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to resolve the
federal issue in a state proceeding. Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).
III.
The test for Younger Abstention is met with respect to Appellant McDaniels. First,
the state proceeding against him was judicial in nature. The New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services filed a complaint for child abuse/neglect on behalf of
McDaniels’ child and an action to terminate his parental rights. Both issues were
adjudicated in New Jersey Superior Court under New Jersey Court Rules. This matter is
ongoing for purposes of Younger Abstention under Huffman because McDaniels could
have appealed the termination of his parental rights first to the Appellate Division and
then to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.; see Rule 2:2-1 and 2:2-3, New Jersey Court
Rules (2001). McDaniels elected to forgo these appeals and instead file the instant federal
claim. Second, New Jersey has a substantial interest in fair administration of child
custody and parental rights proceedings. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427 (1979)
(recognizing this interest). Finally, it is clear that, had he elected to participate, McDaniels
would have had an opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims in the state
judicial proceedings. See Maisonet v. Dep’t of Human Serv., Div. of Family Dev., 657
A.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (N.J. 1995). Accordingly, the district court appropriately abstained
4under Younger from exercising jurisdiction over McDaniels’ claims. 
The Younger Abstention test is also met with respect to Appellant Gonzalez. We
agree with the district court’s determination that, though the decision to rule Gonzalez out
as a possible placement for the child was made by administrative agents, the process by
which the agents made the decision, through inspection, comparison of facts found to
guidelines, etc. was judicial in nature for purposes of Younger Abstention. (Op. of Dist.
Ct. at 15.) Further, Gonzalez could have appealed the administrative determination by
requesting a dispositional conference or an administrative hearing. Either of these
proceedings would have produced agency decisions appealable to the Appellate Division
and ultimately the New Jersey Supreme Court. Gonzalez did not challenge the initial
determination through the appeals process provided and has therefore failed to exhaust
her state appeals as required. See Huffman, 420 U.S. 607-611. Second, as was the case
with McDaniels, New Jersey has a substantial interest in fair administration of child
custody and parental rights proceedings. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 427 (recognizing this
interest). Finally, had she availed herself of the state proceedings available to her, those
proceedings would have presented her with the opportunity to pursue her federal
constitutional claims. See Maisonet, 657 A.2d at 1212-1213. Younger Abstention was
therefore proper. 
Neither McDaniels nor Gonzalez has shown bad faith or extraordinary
circumstances that would qualify as an exception to the proper application of Younger
5Abstention. 
We will affirm the determination of the district court that jurisdiction should not be
exercised over these claims pursuant to the Younger Abstention Doctrine. 
IV.
The Appellants contend also that the district court erred in converting the
Defendant/Appellee’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Rule 56,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
facts belie this concern. The motion ruled on by the district court explicitly invoked Rule
56 in the alternative. See Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996) (deciding
that a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment presented in the alternative provided
sufficient notice to the non-moving party that the court may convert a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). Additionally, there is evidence,
which was noted by the district court, that the Appellants had actual notice that Appellees
were seeking summary judgment. Appellant’s submission to the court was entitled
“Memorandum of Points of Law and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment” and summary judgment was mentioned in the body of the
Memorandum. The district court did not err by converting the motion into a motion to
dismiss and determining that the Appellants had notice that it was considering a motion
for summary judgment. (Op. of the Dist. Ct. at 9 n. 5.)
6* * * * *        
We have considered all contentions raised by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary. The district court correctly applied the Younger
Abstention Doctrine to a motion for summary judgment validly before it. We will affirm.
            
